Time to Eliminate the Houthi Threat

China, Russia, and Iran Support Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea

Strategy Central

For And By Practitioners

By Monte Erfourth - November 29, 2024

Introduction

The Red Sea is one of the world's most vital maritime trade routes, connecting the Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal, and providing a crucial artery for global commerce. It accounts for approximately 15 percent of the world's trade, a staggering statistic that underscores its geopolitical significance. Unfortunately, the security of the Red Sea is increasingly at risk due to the escalation of attacks by Yemen's Houthi rebels, a group heavily backed by Iran and supported indirectly by both Russia and China. This alarming nexus of interests and alliances demands an urgent response from the international community if the stability of the Red Sea and the global economy is to be preserved.

 Iran, China, and Russia: An Unholy Alliance with the Houthis

The Houthis, an Iranian-backed faction that controls large swathes of Yemen, have evolved into an increasingly potent threat to international shipping in the Red Sea. Their operations are supported by Iran, which provides military equipment, training, and strategic guidance. The Houthis have become more sophisticated over time, utilizing advanced drones, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, some of which are supplied by Iran’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Quds Force. Intelligence sources have revealed that Iran has facilitated talks between the Houthis and Russia, resulting in a deal to supply Russian P-800 Oniks anti-ship cruise missiles to the Houthis—a game-changing acquisition that significantly elevates the Houthis' capacity to threaten vessels in the region.

Russia and China, although not directly involved in the conflict, have played roles that exacerbate the situation. Russia has been an enthusiastic supplier of advanced missile technology, partly in response to its growing anti-Western alliance with Iran and China. Moscow's increasing involvement with the Houthis represents a strategic attempt to challenge the West, further complicating the crisis in the Red Sea.

China, on the other hand, represents a paradox in this equation. While China has significant economic interests in the stability of the Red Sea due to its critical position along the Maritime Silk Road, it has, ironically, ended up indirectly financing the Houthi attacks through its massive purchases of Iranian oil. Roughly 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports are purchased by China, providing Iran with the financial resources it needs to fund its proxies in the region, including the Houthis. Despite its need for stable trade routes, China has demonstrated a policy of calculated inaction, choosing instead to criticize U.S.-led attempts to secure the region and avoiding direct involvement. In March 2024, China entered a pact with both Russia and the Houthis to ensure the safety of Chinese vessels, illustrating the complex dynamics that allow Chinese ships a form of immunity from attacks that continue to cripple other nations' shipping.

 Impact on Global Trade and Shipping

The Houthi attacks on vessels transiting the Red Sea have already had a significant impact on global shipping. Since November 2023, shipping companies have increasingly opted to reroute vessels around the southern tip of Africa—a move that adds 1-2 weeks to travel times and drives up fuel costs by approximately $1 million per trip. This has been an economic blow not only to the companies involved but also to global supply chains, exacerbating an already fragile economic situation. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, container traffic through the Red Sea has plummeted by over 60 percent due to these persistent attacks. Not only have global fuel costs risen, but the additional time taken to bypass the Red Sea has disrupted supply chains that many countries, particularly China, rely upon for their export-driven economies.

The United States and some European countries have deployed naval forces in the Red Sea, but the attacks have continued unabated. Houthi tactics, which have included the use of drones and missiles, have proven extremely challenging to counter. These weapons, supplied by Iran and partially funded through illicit Chinese oil purchases, have enabled the Houthis to maintain pressure on international shipping lanes despite Western military efforts to deter them.

Offensive Strategy to Counter the Houthi Threat

The current U.S. approach, Operation Prosperity Guardian, has largely focused on defending commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea. This strategy has proven costly and relatively ineffective, given the disparity between the expensive missile defense systems employed by the U.S. and the cheap drones used by the Houthis. The Biden administration has requested an additional $1 billion over the next two years to develop new counter-drone technologies, but such measures alone are unlikely to be effective without addressing the root cause of the crisis.

Instead, a shift towards an offensive posture is warranted. According to Kevin Zhang, a researcher at the Yorktown Institute, the United States should focus on dismantling the Houthi's command and control infrastructure, their logistical networks, and arms supply routes. Targeting key facilities such as drone production centers, arms depots, and the Iranian supply chain would deal a significant blow to the Houthi's operational capabilities. Additionally, offensive cyber operations could be utilized to disrupt the financial networks that underpin Iranian and Houthi activities, including hawala systems and cryptocurrency channels that have been used to evade international sanctions.

The recent deployment of the USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group to the Red Sea, including several guided missile destroyers and a guided missile submarine, presents an opportunity to implement this offensive strategy. By targeting Houthi assets directly and employing cyber warfare against their financial backers, the U.S. and its allies could significantly degrade the Houthi's capabilities and reassert freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.  Targeting high value targets in the Houthi leadership should also be on the table.

 Why International Action Is Imperative

The Houthi threat in the Red Sea is not an isolated issue but a key component of a broader Iranian strategy aimed at expanding its influence across the Middle East while undermining Western interests. By maintaining the capability to strike international shipping at will, the Houthis pose a direct threat to one of the most crucial arteries of global commerce. Left unchecked, this problem could serve as a model for other state and non-state actors seeking to disrupt vital maritime trade routes, threatening international stability.

The involvement of Russia and China adds an additional layer of complexity to the crisis. Both countries, for reasons tied to their broader geopolitical competition with the United States, have effectively shielded the Houthis from the full weight of international response. Russia's provision of advanced weaponry, coupled with China's economic support through oil purchases, has emboldened the Houthis while giving Moscow and Beijing leverage in their dealings with the West.

The United States and its allies must recognize that a merely defensive approach against Houthi attacks alone is not a sustainable strategy. The continued economic and security costs are too high, and the current defensive approach has demonstrated its limitations. A more aggressive strategy, targeting the sources of Houthi power—including Iranian financial support and logistical infrastructure—is essential. This approach should include applying secondary sanctions on entities that facilitate Iranian oil sales, expanding the scope of targeted sanctions on Iran’s financial institutions and the IRGC, and enhancing oversight through the United Nations' Verification and Inspection Mechanism to ensure that sanctioned goods do not reach Yemen.

The Houthis represent a distinct target when compared to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which U.S. forces have been battling in Yemen for nearly two decades. Unlike AQAP, which can evade capture and relocate, the Houthis have established a solid governance structure in northern Yemen. They rely on a combination of tribal alliances and Zaidi religious authority, led by Abdul Malik al-Houthi. Their governance model integrates political administration with religious oversight, securing loyalty from tribal leaders to create institutions like schools and courts that reflect Zaidi ideology. Militarily, the Houthis are capable of defeating Saudi and UAE forces. They are equipped with ballistic missiles, drones, and advanced air defense systems, employing both guerrilla tactics and conventional military strategies, with additional support from Iran.

In contrast, the primary adversary of the United States in Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), operates as a decentralized network driven by jihadist ideology. This group lacks formal governance and relies on loosely organized cells committed to the pursuit of global jihad. Unlike the Houthis, they do not govern territory; instead, they favor asymmetric warfare tactics, often targeting civilians to achieve their international terror objectives.

The Houthis control and govern significant territory, presenting an opportunity for the U.S. to take action. By targeting their leadership and assets and denying the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) access to the Houthis, the U.S. can effectively disrupt Houthi operations and reduce their attacks.

Mr. Zhang from the Yorktown is correct in stating that the Houthis must be denied support and degraded as a fighting force. To effectively counter the Houthis' maritime attacks, a ground offensive must be launched. This should involve a combined joint operation with special operations, intelligence, and support units focusing on key operational nodes, supply routes, storage facilities, communications, and high-value targets. The goal is to weaken the Houthis' ability to plan and execute attacks on maritime traffic in the Bab Al Mandeb, without attempting to hold territory or improve governance in Yemen.

The aim is to achieve this and then withdraw—no nation-building. Distinct operations should also be conducted against IRGC supply routes and capabilities. If the Houthis are sufficiently weakened, local tribes may take the initiative to eliminate them. Targeting all Iranian shipping to Yemen must remain a priority to cut off any further material support. Furthermore, Iran's last maneuverable elements should be neutralized.

 The Broader Geopolitical Implications

Freedom of navigation is a cornerstone of international stability. Allowing the Houthis to continue their attacks unchecked threatens not only the Red Sea but other strategic waterways around the world, such as the Suez Canal, the Taiwan Strait, and the Strait of Gibraltar. This principle, if compromised, opens the door for other state and non-state actors to challenge maritime security, leading to further global instability. The Biden administration, therefore, must prioritize the elimination of the Houthi threat to prevent further erosion of this critical aspect of international law.

The international community, particularly European and Asian stakeholders who rely on the stability of global trade routes, must also play a role. Europe, which benefits greatly from goods transiting the Red Sea, has an economic incentive to support a more assertive policy in the region. Asian nations, especially China, which has benefited from the relative stability of global shipping, should reconsider their current course of inaction and take more responsibility in ensuring the security of this crucial maritime corridor.

 Conclusion

The crisis in the Red Sea is symptomatic of broader geopolitical shifts, wherein emerging alliances among anti-Western powers threaten to destabilize global norms and economic stability. The Houthis' attacks on international shipping, supported by Iran and indirectly by both Russia and China, represent a direct assault on freedom of navigation and a clear threat to the global economy. To counter this, the United States and its allies must move beyond defensive operations and adopt a comprehensive offensive strategy aimed at dismantling the Houthis as a proxy force.

The United States and Israel have not publicly announced any joint military operations against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. However, both countries have carried out independent military actions due to concerns over Houthi threats to regional stability and international shipping. While these actions demonstrate shared concerns, it may be time to consider joint operations to address this issue. Despite a decade of air and missile strikes from Saudi Arabia, the U.S., Britain, and Israel, the Houthis have proven resilient. They effectively conceal their positions and control key areas along the Red Sea. Nonetheless, they can be weakened through coordinated joint special operations utilizing intelligence and special forces.  European forces should play a role to demonstrate the resolve of the broader international rejection of this form of economic terrorism.

The Trump administration has a real opportunity to resolve this problem. Only by directly destroying Houthi capabilities and denying resupply by the sources of Houthi support—namely Iranian finances, logistical infrastructure, and the indirect support provided by Russia and China—can the international community hope to restore stability to the Red Sea. Failure to do so will not only perpetuate the current crisis but also embolden other actors to challenge the rules-based international order on which global trade depends. The gains in deterrence will be well worth the price.

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 Bibliography

• Kevin Zhang, "An Offensive Strategy Against the Houthi Threat," RealClearDefense, November 22, 2024.

• David Scott, "China's Calculated Inaction in the Red Sea Crisis," Center for International Maritime Security, May 6, 2024.

• Matthew Karnitschnig, "How China Ended Up Financing the Houthis' Red Sea Attacks," POLITICO, March 28, 2024.